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Abstract
Objectives: To determine the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission by aerosols, to provide evidence on the rational use
of masks, and to discuss additional measures important for the protection of healthcare workers from COVID-19.
Methods: Literature review and expert opinion.
Short conclusion: SARS-CoV-2, the pathogen causing COVID-19, is considered to be transmitted via droplets rather
than aerosols, but droplets with strong directional airflow support may spread further than 2 m. High rates of
COVID-19 infections in healthcare-workers (HCWs) have been reported from several countries. Respirators such as
filtering face piece (FFP) 2 masks were designed to protect HCWs, while surgical masks were originally intended to
protect patients (e.g., during surgery). Nevertheless, high quality standard surgical masks (type II/IIR according to
European Norm EN 14683) appear to be as effective as FFP2 masks in preventing droplet-associated viral infections
of HCWs as reported from influenza or SARS. So far, no head-to-head trials with these masks have been published
for COVID-19. Neither mask type completely prevents transmission, which may be due to inappropriate handling
and alternative transmission pathways. Therefore, compliance with a bundle of infection control measures including
thorough hand hygiene is key. During high-risk procedures, both droplets and aerosols may be produced, reason
why respirators are indicated for these interventions.
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Background
Regarding the optimal protection of healthcare workers
(HCW), there are concerns about the use of surgical
masks versus respirators (such as FFP2 or N95) when
caring for COVID-19 patients in healthcare settings.
There are many enquiries from healthcare institutions
and HCWs as to whether surgical masks offer sufficient
protection compared to respirators when providing care
to a patient with COVID-19.
The aim of this article is to review the epidemiology of
COVID-19 in HCWs, to interpret the scientific data on
aerosol versus droplet transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (the
causative agent of COVID-19), to compare basic character-
istics between surgical masks and respirators, and to evalu-
ate the evidence of protection between these two mask
types. This will provide the scientific basis for the current
recommendations on the use of surgical masks versus res-
pirators for HCW in contact with COVID-19 patients.
Epidemiology of COVID-19 in healthcare workers
Within 4 months, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused
more than four million documented infections and over
300′000 deaths [1]. Work-related infections of HCWs have
been described early on and provoked vivid discussions
about the optimal personal protective equipment (PPE). Wu
et al. reported an infection rate of 3.8% among HCWs in
Wuhan [2], others reported up to 29% of HCWs being in-
fected [3]. In the Netherlands, 86 of 1′353 HCWs (6%), all
presenting with fever and/or respiratory symptoms within 1
month after the onset of the epidemic in their country, were
found to be SARS-CoV-2 positive [4]. Importantly, no more
than 3/86 had been exposed to an inpatient with COVID-19
infection, suggesting acquisition of the virus in the commu-
nity. For the United States, the US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) reported an average infection rate
of 3% in HCW with certain states experiencing rates of up to
11%, possibly due to more complete reporting of HCW sta-
tus [5]. Infected HCW indicated exclusive healthcare
exposure in 55%, exclusive household exposure in
27% and exclusive community exposure in 13% [5]. In
March 2020, positivity rates of HCWs in an English
hospital with symptom-based screening showed an ex-
ponential increase within 20 days from 5 to 20% [6].
Remarkably, employees with and without direct pa-
tient contact showed similar incidence rates of
COVID-19, implying that community-acquired disease
or transmission among co-workers were more likely
than nosocomial transmission from infected patients
[6]. The observation that infection rates of HCWs in
this study dropped as the prevalence in the hospital
increased further supported the hypothesis that em-
ployees of the hospital had mainly been infected out-
side the healthcare setting.
The high transmissibility of coronavirus has been re-
ported before for both, SARS-1 and MERS, with propor-
tions of infected HCW ranging from 13 to 43%, based
on country-specific data. For individual outbreaks, up to
59% of affected individuals were HCWs [7].
Transmission pathways
COVID-19 may spread in four ways. The proposed three
“direct” transmission ways are i) by infectious droplets ex-
pulsed by coughing or sneezing onto a mucous membrane
(mouth, nose, eyes); ii) by aerosols from established
sources such as mechanical ventilation or bronchoscopy,
but - and this is controversial – may also include singing
or even talking; and iii) by direct contact (e.g., by kissing,
touching hands or other parts of a body contaminated
with infectious respiratory or fecal material). The fourth,
indirect transmission way is by contact with contaminated
surfaces (fomites). However, fomites are considered likely
rare sources of transmission [8–13].
The lack of understanding of the detailed mechanisms of
transmission may explain the discrepancy of the recommen-
dation to protect the HCWs with surgical masks versus respi-
rators: on the one hand, World Health Organization, Public
Health England, and Swissnoso recommend the use of surgi-
cal masks to protect against droplet transmission of SARS-
CoV-2 and limit use of respirators for aerosol-generating pro-
cedures (AGPs) [8, 11, 12]. On the other hand, the United
States Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention, the Euro-
pean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and the Ger-
man Robert Koch Institute recommend universal use of
respirators for protection against airborne transmission, where
available [9, 10, 14].
What is the evidence for SARS-CoV-2 transmission via
aerosols?
Reproductive number, superspreading events and
asymptomatic transmission
Based on i) an initial reproductive number (R0) of ~ 2 [15]
- as compared to 18 for measles, a classical example of air-
borne transmission [16] - and ii) low secondary attack
rates, the person-to-person spread of SARS-CoV-2 has
been postulated to occur predominantly through droplet
and contact transmissions. Secondary attack rates for
household and close contacts (mostly defined as spending
> 15min in < 2m distance) were 10.5 and 0.45% in the
US, and 14.9 and 9.6% in Shenzhen, respectively [17, 18].
A superspreader is an individual who is more likely to
infect others, compared with a typical infected person.
Superspreading events have occurred during the SARS-1
and MERS epidemics and also occurs with SARS-CoV-2:
Recently, one choir singer likely infected 53/61 attendees
during singing practice [19]. Host, pathogen, environ-
mental and behavioral factors may drive superspreading
events, leading to an effective reproduction number
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similar as observed with aerosol-transmitted pathogens.
But, this does not necessarily support aerosol transmis-
sion [20]: Singing in chorus may be associated with a
massive expectoration of droplets. Together with the
close distance between singers and poorly ventilated
rooms, this may lead to a R0 mimicking the one of aero-
sol transmission. At the end, droplet versus aerosol
transmission within close distances and a high inoculum
is likely to be a continuum [21]. Finally, given the high
transmissibility of COVID-19 in oligo- and pre-
symptomatic patients, a plausible and important hypoth-
esis is that a face-to-face conversation might be adequate
to transmit COVID-19, even if both individuals do not
touch each other, but this does not imply aerosol trans-
mission [13].
Infectious droplets and aerosols
An infectious aerosol is a collection of pathogen-laden par-
ticles in air, usually with a diameter of below 5–10 μm [22].
Aerosol transmission occurs when infectious aerosols are
generated by an infectious person, the pathogen remains vi-
able in the air for some period of time, and the target tis-
sues in which the pathogen initiates infection can be
reached by the aerosol [22]. Particles ≤10 μm are consid-
ered respirable particles capable of reaching the lower air-
ways, whereas particles with 10–100 μm are considered
inspirable particles limited to reach the upper airways [23].
Recent work has demonstrated that sneezing and
coughing not only generates mucosalivary droplets, but
also a multiphase turbulent gas (a puff) with a highly di-
verse and volatile composition that can span 7–8m (Fig. 1)
[21]. Of note, the impact of this finding on infections is
yet unknown. Large droplets may settle faster than they
evaporate, contaminating the immediate vicinity of the in-
fected individual. Alternatively, the moist and warm at-
mosphere within the turbulent gas cloud may prevent
evaporation for much longer than occurs with isolated
droplets, thus mimicking aerosol transmission. In contrast,
small droplets may evaporate faster than they settle form-
ing true “droplet nuclei” or aerosols.
Most knowledge on aerosols has been derived from
experimental machine-generated particles, which makes
extrapolation to the clinical setting difficult. Aerosols
with ≤10% of the particles being > 8 μm may be gener-
ated by breathing, talking or singing [13, 24], while in
natural coughing 99% of the particles are larger than
8 μm and therefore mostly represent droplets [25].
Clinical evidence for true aerosol transmission of
SARS-CoV-2 in humans?
A recent laboratory study showed that artificially
aerosolized SARS-CoV-2 survived in the air as long as
SARS-CoV-1 and persisted even longer on surfaces,
from where it might become resuspended by turbulent
air [26]. However, these in vitro results are not consist-
ent with the observation of R0 around 2, and the rapid
decrease of the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 after limiting
socializing in Switzerland to less than 5 individuals [15].
Several clinical studies have identified SARS-CoV-2
RNA in air samples and significant environmental con-
tamination, yet without documentation of viable virus
[27–30]. This indicates that SARS-CoV-2 is shed to the
environment as small, virus-laden particles, during toi-
leting, through contact with fomites and from infected
patients, but again this does not prove that it corre-
sponds to infectious aerosols [27–29]. Accordingly, air-
flow can disperse particles with viral RNA in a room;
however, this does not prove COVID-19 to be a truly
aerosol-transmitted disease.
In contrast, transmittable virus had been cultured from
fomite samples in a MERS-CoV outbreak in South Korea
[31]. Such data have resulted in guidelines unanimously
requiring contact isolation in addition to droplet precau-
tions and propagating strict hand hygiene.
Beyond SARS-CoV-2, patients with influenza, human
corona- and rhinovirus infections shed small aerosol
particles < 5 μm in exhaled breath [32]. For influenza, vi-
able virus could be cultured from such aerosols [24].
Yan and coworkers isolated infectious virus in 39% of
fine aerosols collected from breath of influenza patients,
yet with a concentration 4 logs lower than in nasopha-
ryngeal swabs, which may question transmissibility in a
clinical context [33]. Fine-particle exhaled aerosols (<5um)
reflected infection in the lung; sneezing and coughing were
not necessary for infectious aerosol generation. The conclu-
sion was that influenza infection in the upper and lower
airways is compartmentalized and as such behaving inde-
pendently [33].
Despite these data demonstrating contagious aerosols
of influenza in an experimental context, its transmission
has successfully been prevented with droplet precautions
Fig. 1 Multiphase Turbulent Gas Cloud from a Human Sneeze.
Reprinted with written permission from JAMA [21]
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in clinical practice, casting doubt on the generalizability
of these experimental laboratory based findings in the
clinical setting.
Finally, viable SARS-1 has not been detected in aero-
sols emitted by or generated from an infectious person.
Experimental infection in SARS-1 has never been dem-
onstrated via the aerosol route [22].
SARS-CoV-2 transmitted by droplets with a range > 2m
Based on the above, transmission of respiratory infec-
tions cannot be dichotomized in classical droplet trans-
mission within a range < 2m and aerosol transmission
beyond 2m distance (Fig. 2). Rather, more recent studies
describe droplets to travel in the air for > 2 and up to 8
m - long enough to not fall under the common classifi-
cation of “droplet” infection [19, 21, 34]. The postulated
droplet range < 1-2 m is largely based on a publication
from 1942 using still photography [35] and from work of
Hall et al. on RSV from 1977 to 1982 [36]. However, in
contrast to aerosols, viable droplets will ultimately fall to
the floor, and will neither stay airborne nor infectious
for several hours like a typical aerosol transmitted virus
such as measles or varicella virus would.
In January 2020, a COVID-19 outbreak occurred in an
air-conditioned restaurant in Guangzhou, China. It in-
volved three family clusters > 2 m apart, suggesting aero-
sol transmission. However, when considering airflow
direction and air exchange rates, findings were compat-
ible with droplet transmission [37].
A SARS-1 outbreak in airline passengers was related to
the physical proximity to the index patient, with illness re-
ported in 8 of the 23 persons who were seated in the three
rows in front of the index patient, as compared with 10 of
the 88 persons who were seated elsewhere [38]. Directed
air ventilation or strong unobstructed coughing/sneezing
by the index patient may have supported the transmission
to exposed passengers primarily in the front [38].
As a consequence, social distancing by ≥2 m may not
always be enough to prevent droplet infections in a set-
ting with uncontrolled coughing, sneezing and turbulent
air flow such as in hospitals. Surgical masks for HCWs,
as currently practiced in most Swiss hospitals, seems
prudent in such settings [12]. This is further supported
by recent work demonstrating how surgical masks pre-
vent the emission of viable viral particles [39]. Further
studies which illuminate the narrow line between droplet
and aerosol are clearly needed [34].
“Aerosol-generating procedures” (AGP)
This term is frequently used for procedures reported to
represent an increased risk of transmission to HCW dur-
ing the SARS-1 epidemic. Higher infection rates have been
well documented for manual ventilation before intubation,
intubation itself, tracheotomy and non-invasive ventilation
(Table 1) [40]. Remarkably, it has not been proven that in-
creased transmissibility in these settings is related to aero-
sol transmission. In the case of non-invasive ventilation,
the high infection rate may also have been related to poor
adherence to standard precautions [40].
A study that objectified aerosol particle generation
during patient care activities only could identify nebu-
lized medication administration as a significant source of
aerosols [41]. Of importance, this work was performed
in patients without viral infections and the impact on in-
fection transmission is unknown [41]. Subsequent at-
tempts also failed to correlate several presumable AGPs
to a statistically significant probability of sampling a
H1N1-RNA positive aerosol [42].
Fig. 2 Droplet transmission and high-risk procedures (potentially generating aerosol). Inner/outer semicircle indicate 2/8 m distance from the
patients (center). Center-Right: A high-risk transmission procedure is depicted (“potentially aerosol generating procedure”), where a FFP2 mask is
required. Center-Left: Uncontrolled coughing in hospital may cause a turbulent gas cloud to spread beyond 2m [21]. Regular speech, even in
asymptomatically infected patients may generate infectious droplets that travel 1-2 m. This is the rational of HCW to wear surgical masks in the
hospital when caring for patients
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Still, several national and international guidelines
stated that these presumable AGPs are high-risk proce-
dures necessitating FFP2 protection. However, this pos-
sibly relates to high level of viral exposure from droplet
clouds rather than indication transmission by the air-
borne route (Fig. 2) [12].
Mask types to protect HCW from COVID-19 transmission
Surgical masks versus respirators
In light of this evidence, we address the question which
type of mask ought to be used by HCWs to protect
themselves and if this choice should be guided by indi-
vidual transmission risks of specific procedures. Two
main forms of disposable masks are currently being used
in the Swiss healthcare system (Table 2): A standard sur-
gical mask (type II) which forms a barrier against drop-
lets and, optionally, splashes (type IIR). Surgical masks
are intended to protect the patient (e.g., during surgery
from respiratory tract bacteria exhaled by the surgical
team) and undergo standardized testing before being
marketed in Europe (Standard EN 14683). From prac-
tical, yearlong experience, we know though, they also
protect the HCW. Of note, the size of SARS-CoV-2 is
approximately 120 nm, and therefore, 10 to 50 times
smaller than Staphylococcus aureus, the test pathogen
for the effectiveness of surgical masks. Nevertheless, the
virus is on droplets and therefore the size of the virus
does not play a critical role.
Surgical masks adapt rather loosely to the face of the
user and can be worn for a maximum of 8 h, but should
be changed earlier when damaged or visibly wet. To
avoid self-contamination, they should not be worn
around the neck in-between use.
In contrast, respirators are available in Europe as FFP
("filtering face piece) masks (Standard EN 149), in the
US as an N95 mask. There are three categories depending
on filter performance of particles > 0.3 μm: FFP1 (> 80%),
FFP2 (> 94%) and FFP3 (> 99%). FFP2 masks are intended
to protect the carrier from the inhalation of airborne par-
ticles. The FFP2 testing procedure requires also a maximal
level of microbial contaminated air that leaks through a
respirator. This is the reason why they require fit-testing
to ensure a tight seal around the user’s face. Many users
perceive this as discomfort, which may interfere with com-
pliance [43]. Of importance, FFP2 masks with expiratory
valves are not indicated in the COVID-19 setting, as they
do not protect others.
Guidelines recommend the use of surgical masks for use in
suspected or confirmed COVID-19 patients, with enhanced
protection using FFP2 for the so called AGPs [8, 11, 12].
Indirect evidence consistently supports the use of surgical
masks
Most of the research comparing the protective effect of
surgical masks with respirator masks has been generated
from influenza or other relatively benign respiratory dis-
eases. To date, there are no published head-to-head
studies in COVID-19. The current guidelines are there-
fore extrapolated from influenza and previous outbreaks
of SARS-1 and MERS, and on expert opinion [12, 44].
Table 1 Procedures associated with increased risk of SARS-1 transmission to healthcare workers
Procedure Point or Pooled estimate (OR, 95% CI)
Tracheal intubation (4 cohort studies & 4 case-control studies) 6.6 (2.3–18.9) & 6.6 (4.1–10.6)
Non-invasive ventilation (2 cohort studies) 3.1 (1.4–6.8)
Tracheotomy (1 case-control study) 4.2 (1.5–11.5)
Manual ventilation before intubation (1 cohort study) 2.8 (1.3–6.4)
Adapted from Tran et al. [40]: Risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections to healthcare workers caring for patients undergoing risk procedures compared
with the risk of transmission to healthcare workers caring for patients not undergoing risk procedures. Most studies included in the systemic review assessed
whether healthcare workers had proper infection control training or wore personal protective equipment while caring for patients with laboratory-confirmed SARS
Table 2 Surgical masks versus FFP2, specification according to EN standard
Certification/ Class (Standard) FFP2 (EN 149) Type II Surgical Mask (EN 14683)
Protection Protection of the carrier against solid and liquid
aerosols
Protection against droplet ejection from
the carrier*
Application Self protection / Industrial safety External protection*
Filter performance – (must be ≥ X% efficient) 0.3 Microns ≥94% 3.0 Microns: ≥ 98%
0.1 Microns: No requirement
Total inward leakage ≤ 8% leakage (arithmetic mean) No requirement
Exposure to of inert particles and live aerosolised
influenza virus
Estimated 100-fold reduction** Estimated 6-fold reduction**
*This description meets the requirements of the EN standard. However, the evidence described in the body of the article and many years of experience show that
surgical masks provide sufficient self-protection
**According to the Health and Safety Laboratory for the Health and Safety Executive 2008, https://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr619.pdf
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Despite the documentation of infectious influenza
aerosols in clinical samples [24], evidence of aerosol
transmission in clinical practice has neither been found
for influenza nor for SARS. A recent meta-analysis of 4
RCTs including 6418 patients did not provide any evi-
dence that medical masks are inferior to N95 respirators
for protecting healthcare workers against laboratory-
confirmed viral infection (OR 1.06, 95% CI 0.90–1.25) or
influenza (OR 0.94, 0.79–1.20) [45]. In addition, a meta-
analysis of observational studies provided evidence of a
similar protective effect of surgical masks (OR = 0.13;
95% CI: 0.03–0.62) and respirators (OR = 0.12; 95% CI:
0.06–0.26) compared with no mask against SARS-1 [44].
Consistent results also were provided by two case-
control studies in influenza and SARS-1 [46].
These findings are supported by preliminary epidemio-
logical data from an anecdotal report describing no
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in 35 HCW protected by sur-
gical masks who were exposed to aerosol-generating
procedures including intubation, extubation and non-
invasive ventilation [47].
A recently published meta-analysis comparing differ-
ent types of masks versus no mask reported better pro-
tection against MERS, SARS and COVID-19 in studies
using FFP2 (96% protection rate) compared to surgical
masks (77% protection rate) [48]. This conclusion should
be seen with caution, as they are based on in-between
study rather than within-study comparisons. Further-
more, studies in a healthcare setting, which more fre-
quently used FFP2 masks, have been shown to generally
perform better than studies performed in the commu-
nity. Direct comparisons between the two mask types
are mandatory.
In summary, the current knowledge provides no scien-
tific evidence from head-to-head studies in favor of
using FFP2 instead of a surgical mask outside the so-
called AGPs.
When mask protection seems to fail
Independent of the respiratory precautions taken, noso-
comial transmissions of respiratory viral infections may
occur. This underlines that masks are only one compo-
nent of complex measures that include goggles or face
shields and gowns. A recent metaanalysis has described
a 78% reduction in infections when eye protection was
used [48]. Even more important are behavioral measures
to support proper wearing (donning) and removal (doff-
ing) as well as general infection control measures, in
particular hand hygiene [49]. Particular care should be
taken to ensure that masks are not contaminated on in-
animate surfaces [50].
A SARS-1 outbreak among HCW in Toronto has been
related to lack of adequate infection control training, in-
consistent PPE use and fatigue rather than the choice of
a wrong mask. More than 50% reported remembering
breaches in infection control precautions [51].
Four publications have shown that a similar propor-
tion of HCWs wearing respirators and masks became in-
fected with influenza within the same study (Table 3).
The absolute incidence of infections varied considerably
across studies, stressing the importance of factors other
than respiratory protection.
While masks protect HCWs from viral infections, they
may not always be protective in community settings
[55]. This most probably is due to incorrect donning
and doffing of previously contaminated masks and lack
of hand hygiene. Mask contamination occurs both by re-
spiratory droplets from close contacts of individuals
wearing the mask or by the wearer’s own hands. Viral
contamination of most touchable surfaces with virus has
been documented even in rooms of fully recovered pa-
tients with MERS-CoV [29, 31]. Studies recovering vi-
able influenza virus from masks and respirators illustrate
that virus trapped on the surfaces poses an indirect con-
tact transmission risk [56]. Observations in public areas
have revealed that individuals touch environmental sur-
faces and their mouth/nose mucosa more than 3 times
per hour [57]. Considering one’s need for mask reposi-
tioning or rubbing, the rate of touching a mask presum-
ably is even higher. When manipulated incorrectly,
masks may not efficiently prevent from infection. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis of secondary infection from
a contaminated mask by hands then touching the mu-
cosa is the observation by Aiello et al. and Cowling et al.
that masks only were protective when combined with
hand disinfection [58, 59].
Missed diagnoses of COVID-19 infection with a lack of
adequate infection control measures represents another
Table 3 Absolute risk of laboratory-confirmed influenza infection in healthcare workers by the type of mask worn
Study Included
Patients
(n)
Randomization Incidence of laboratory-confirmed influenza infection
Mask Respirator
Loeb, 2009 [52] 446 Individual 22.2% 21.7%
MacIntyre, 2011 [53] 1441 Cluster 1.2% 0.4%
MacIntyre, 2013 [43] 1669 Cluster 0.3% 0.5%
Radanovich, 2019 [54] 2862 Cluster 7.3% 8.3%
Adapted from Bartasko et al. [45]
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potential reason for protection failures. For MERS-CoV,
SARS-1 and SARS-CoV-2, nosocomial transmission related
to delayed diagnosis rather than the choice of the type of
mask for respiratory isolation have been reported [60, 61].
Conclusion
HCWs at the frontline have significant exposure to SARS-
CoV-2 during work. In addition, infected HCW may fur-
ther transmit COVID-19 to patients if PPE is not worn
correctly or adherence to hand hygiene is low. The ab-
sence of clear scientific evidence for aerosol transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 provide the rationale for the current rec-
ommendations for the use of surgical masks. Respirators
are suggested for certain defined procedures with higher
transmission risk. Importantly, masking is only one com-
ponent of the infection control bundle including hand hy-
giene. Current data provide sufficient evidence for
protection of HCW to patients and self by surgical masks.
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